

MEMORANDUM

To:

1. ~~Harry Rowen~~

2. Dan Ellsberg

Date: 30 Oct.

From: Konrad Kellen

FYI

MEMORANDUM

To: Kellen/Gurtov Date 10-29-69
From: F. C. Iklé

From Frank Denton:

"I am enclosing an article from the Bangkok World which we saw while there. Arnold and crew might be interested if they haven't already seen it. The letter is getting quite a play in Southeast Asia. A number of people in a variety of professions have mentioned it to me. Most of the comments outside of the official U.S. community have been very favorable."

Breaking the Apparatchik's code

By Joseph Kraft

WHEN six analysts from the Rand Corporation drop their slide rules and open their mouths to protest about Vietnam, something important has happened.

For the Rand protest, expressed in letters to the editors of the New York Times and the Washington Post, goes beyond the issue of Vietnam to the central moral problem of American public life. It raises the question of the responsibility borne by officials and analysts for the actions and policies of the governments they serve.

Rand, which has its headquarters here in Santa Monica, is one of the oldest and most professional of the research institutions set up by the government after World War II to analyze problems of national security. It derives about 75 percent of its annual budget from the De-

partment of Defense. It does extensive work with classified material. It has recently begun to do a series of special studies for Henry Kissinger and the National Security Council. Its existence depends on having funds from, and good relations with the Federal government.

In the past, Rand analysts have repeatedly questioned prevailing government policies behind closed doors. Individual Rand staff members have participated in public discussions. But the six men involved in the present letter—Daniel Ellsberg, Melvin Gurtov, Oleg Holfding, Arnold Horelick, Konrad Kellen, and Paul F. Langer—go way beyond the tradition. For they speak out as a group in direct opposition to a government policy which they previously supported. They published their letter over

strong opposition from some of Rand's chief executives. And they did so at some risk to their future careers.

The basic argument on Vietnam unfolds in three stages. The first point is that Washington has committed itself to a Saigon regime that does not want peace. As the letter says: "The primary interest of the present Saigon leadership is to perpetuate its status and power, and that interest is not served by seeking an end to hostilities through negotiations, but only by continuing the war with U.S. support."

The second point is that the other side cannot be made to negotiate on Saigon's terms. The letter says: "Even if a new strategy should produce military successes in Vietnam, substantially reduce U.S. costs, and dampen domestic opposition, Hanoi

could not be induced to make any concessions—so long as they implied recognition of the authority of the Saigon government."

The argument concludes with the proposition that, since the United States cannot bring either Hanoi or Saigon to negotiate, this country's best option is to walk away from the war. The letter says: "We believe that the United States should decide now to end its participation in the Vietnam war, completing the total withdrawal of our forces within one year at the most."

There is nothing shocking in these views. They are shared by many high officials in this and previous administrations. What is remarkable is that only a handful of those who have come to believe these ideas have said so in public.

Bangkok World

October 16, 1969